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A squadron of five helicopters swooped down over
the sleepy village, awakening the population with a
barrage of gun fire and killing several villagers who
were out in the open and unable to find shelter. A few
days later, a troop of sorne hundred soldiers sur-
rounded the area making escape impossible. They
closed in and demanded a village assembly in the
main square. The officer told the villagers that they
had 15 days to "repent their sins" and admit their sup-
port of the guerrilla movement. The officer expected
the villagers to come forward with names of people
who were guerrilla members, or families who har-
boured and fed them. If they didn't, they would
witness a far greater retribution than they had ex-
perienced a few days before. Stories of military
atrocities carried out in other villages, and this par-
ticular experience, were enough to have the Perez
family and sorne 50 others pack up their meager
belongings and start their long trek through the
Guatemala forests into Mexico.
Numbers
The total number of refugees in Mexico from
Guatemala is now estimated at 200,000. (The most re-
cent large entry occurred in June 1983, in the Ococ-
ingo area of Chiapas where sorne 1,000 refugees
crossed the border en masse.) Sorne 90,000 of these,
principally children, women and older people, reside
across a narrow strip along the Mexico-Guatemala
border with the highest concentration found in the
San Cristobal region where there are 77 settlements
and 18 camps with 45,000 refugees.
Background
Guatemalan - refugees in Mexico are primarily in-
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In Guatemala, the long history of ruthless military dic-
tatorship reached its apex under the recently deposed
regime of Efrain Rios Montt. Since the overthrow of
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's government in 1954, the mil-
itary has exercised an uninterrupted control over the
country. In the last 30 years, an estimated 50,000 to
80,000 people have died at the hands of the military -
the vast majority of them peasants and rural workers.
In recent years the violence has intensified under the
rules of GeneraIs Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt. In the
face of rising opposition worker mobilization (par-
ticularly resulting from the reconstruction efforts
following the earthquake of 1976), the government
established a conscious policy of subverting possible
opposition.
The first phase of the policy was targeted at communi-
ty leaders (in particular, clerical workers). As phase
one failed to counteract the mounting activity of the
guerrilla movement, a second phase was institu-
tionalized under Lucas Garcia and intensified under
Rios Montt which involved bombing and large-scale
harrassment. Its intent was to destroy the ''base'' of
guerrilla activity. The increased repression involved
destroying food supplies by burning peasant fields and
killing livestock, as weIl as systematic elimination of
"suspected" guerrillas. Moreover, the repression
assumed a racist dimension as most of the perceived
opposition was seen to come from the Indian popula-
tions (600/0 of the country).
Following the coup d'etat in March of 1982 which
brought Rios Montt to power, sorne speculated that
the spiral of political violence would cease. Instead,
matters worsened. On July 30, 1982, Rios Montt
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declared a state of siege for "30 days" -
by December 30, it was still in effect;
and the President is on record as having
stated that "we declared a state of siege
so we could kill legaIly." In the first
month of the siege, 9,000 Guatemalans
fled to Mexico.
The following nine months witnessed a
cumulative increase in the flow of
refugees, primarily from the northern
provinces bordering on Mexico (El
Quiche, Huehuetenango, San Marcos,
Quetzaltenango, Tolonicapan, Solola,
Chimaltenango, Alta Verapaz and Baja
Verapaz). These provinces also have
large percentages of indigenous popula-
tions. VirtuaIly aIl the refugees are In-
dians whose long history of subjugation
in a traditionally racially divided socie-
ty reached its culmination under Rios
Montt. Though the depiction of the mil-
itary's policy as genocidal may be ex-
cessive, there is little doubt that the in-
digenous peoples have been singled out
for political persecution or death.
Shortly after the implementation of the
siege, on July 17th, the entire village-
rural-estate of San Fransisco, comprised
of Chij Indians was massacred. Only
four men survived. According to an
American Anthropological Association
estimate, 350 men, women and children
of aIl ages were systematically killed.
Many of the refugees in the state of
Chiapas in Mexico cited the San Fran-
sisco massacre as the incident which
drove them to flee. They feared the
spread of the government's policy of
destruction.
The massacre of San Fransisco,
though not untypical, was important in
one other respect. A combination of
pressure by the U.S. administration (to
reform the Guatemalan military's anti-
guerrilla tactics), and a massive out-
cry in response to the publicity attracted
by the massacre, provoked Rios Montt
to alter his strategy. His continued of-
fensive would henceforth involve: (1) a
professionalization of the military; (2)
the introduction of compulsory service
in civilian militias; and (3) a so-called
"frijoles y fusiles" (beans and rifles)
campaign. The latter attempt would
provide beans for those sectors willing
to tolerate the regime and treat so-called
insurgent sectors forcibly.
A sophisticated merger of civic action
programmes and public relations served
to obscure the continued repression.
Thus Guatemala could testify to an im-
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proving human rights record. Obscuring
of reality was extended to the under-
standing of the plight of the refugees in
an attempt to diminish the criticism that
was directed at Rios Montt.
The peak flow of refugees to Chiapas
occurred in the period between October
and December 1982 under the revised
version of Rios Montt's anti-guerrilla
movement. In the last week of October
and the first week of November, 10,000
refugees (UNHCR estimates) crossed the
border. Many of these were expelled.
The Coordinator of Programs for the
UNHCR, Alfredo Witschi, suggests that
most of the refugees arriving up until
February of 1983 had left their villages
the preceding June and had been
wandering until their arrivaI in
Chiapas.
Witschi estimates that 95 % of the
refugees are from villages in the border
provinces of Guatemala. AlI the
refugees spoken to came from within a
day's walk from the camps. The option
of fleeing to Mexico for those further
away from the border was precluded by
the rough terrain and the difficulties of
travel in the region. They are forced to
remain in Guatemala. Consequently,
according to the Director of the Anthro-
pology Resource Centre, 500,000 to
1,000,000 people are believed to be
homeless within Guatemala. But
Guatemalan authorities have ensured
that little can become known of these
internal refugees.
In fact, no involved nation is prepared
to expose the reality of the refugee situa-
tion. Little can be learned about the
condition of the refugees who have
managed to escape. One complicating
factor is Mexico's non-committal to the
Protocol of 1967 or the 1951 Conven-
tion. Mexico's fear of the spread of the
"Central American Syndrome", com-
pounded by the tradition of social
unrest in Chiapas, has led to an attempt
to curtail the flow into Chiapas of
potentially disrupting Guatemalan
refugees.
Nor has Mexico ever maintained a
coherent policy vis-a-vis Guatemala in
general (unlike their open support of
Nicaragua and the FDR of El Salvador).
Sorne commentators add that U.S. pres-
sure on Mexico to deliberately contain
and downplay the refugee issue is
designed to minimize potential criticism
of the Guatemalan military regime in
Reagan's bid to supply military aide
The administration and care of the
refugees who have fled to Mexico is
undertaken by the Mexican Commis-
sion to Help Refugees (COMAR). But
the implementation of its policy is
wrought with confusion. COMAR's
plans for the future, for instance, are
nebulous. Not only has there been no
consistent policy (aside from isolation)
on the part of the government, but the
Commission itself is under a state of
flux as the new administration of
Miguel de la Madrid begins to percolate
through the bureaucracy. It is clear,
however, that COMAR is becoming
more "hard-line".
COMAR comprises several ministries.
The major ones are External Affairs (the
haven for the more progressive wing of
the ruling PRI party), Labour, InternaI
Affairs and Immigration (the haven for
the more conservative-xenophobic
members of the PRI). In June 1983, Or-
tiz Monestario, an appointee of ex-
president Lopez Portillo's from the In-
ternaI Affairs ministry, was replaced by
an Immigration man: Mario Vallejo.
And the graduaI marginalization of the
External Affairs branch in determining
policy was illustrated by the fact that
the news of the COMAR shake-up was
discovered by External Affairs the day
after it had already occurred. As COM-
AR moves more "hard-line", matters
will not improve substantially for the
refugees.
The result of the Mexican government's
ambiguity and COMAR's drift to a
"hardline" position has been to deny the
refugees the benefits of attaining refugee
status. Indeed, Interior Minister Manuel
Bartlett refers to the refugees, as "des-
plazados" or displaced people, the in-
tention being to place them where they
belong. This at least permits the
authorities to contain the flow and
mobility of the refugees, and isolate
them from the rest of the world. This
permits the new Mexican regime to
adopt a policy to remove the refugee
disturbance altogether .
The alternative of repatriating the
"desplazados" ta Guatemala floats
through the COMAR ranks as an in-
creasingly serious option. The
Guatemalan government regularly
makes overtures promising passive
resettlement (including land offerings
and supervision by missionaries) and
guaranteed safety to the refugees and
Mexican authorities. But Interior
Minister Bartlett is committed to no
refoulment of refugees. Herein lies the
problem: Guatemalans are yet to be
recognized as refugees. As "des-
plazados Il their repatriation would con-
travene no laws. Hence, technicaIly the
refugees could be forced to return even
though this is not official policy.
However, the general lack of coherent
policies vis-a-vis the totality of the
Guatemalan situation prevents a deci-
sion whether or not to evict the
refugees. In aIl probability, a preserva-
tion of the status quo and derailment of
international pressure by containing
and isolating the refugees will continue
to be the Mexican approach, if only to
allow the Mexicans some flexibility and
to minimize potential criticism by inter-
naI or external sources.
In southern Mexico, there are currently
40,000 refugees organized into 57 dif-
ferent camps administered by COMAR
and supported primarily by the
UNHCR. The remaining approximately
100,000 refugees are integrated into
Mexican villages (mostly communal
"ejidos") in the southern zone of the
border region. Apart from assistance
provided by the Church, the latter
group of refugees receives no official
support.
The government policy in the region has
changed considerably in the past. Mex-
ico pursued a policy of refoulment (con-
trary to the Convention and Protocol)
for an extended period until sufficient
international pressure was brought to
bear on their policy. On October 21,
1982, 1,500 refugees were expelled from
Mexico even though they were told by
immigration officiaIs that they were to
be relocated further inside Mexico. Five
days later, 2,000 refugees living in
Camp Rancho Tejas were ordered back
to Guatemala. Though the practice of
refoulement has ceased, rumours of
repatriation of the refugees continue to
abound.
Until March of this year, incursions by
the Guatemalan armed forces into Mex-
ican territory were frequent. The Rios
Montt regime justified the violation of
Mexican territorial integrity by claim-
ing, as Presidential Press Secretary
Escobar ArqueIlo did, that "the fact that
they are refugees in Mexico shows that
they are rebel collaborators and their
false accusations reveal the subversives'
capacity to spread lies about the gov-
ernment." Mexican official response to
such actions had been muted. Troops
were not sent and the tone of Mexican
warnings was unduly soft. This failure
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to act decisively was indicative of Mex-
ico's general lack of policy on the
Guatemalan issue and its hesitancy to
becorne involved too deeply in the geo-
politics of the region. Sorne analysts
suggest that the cessation of raids was a
result of international outcry as weIl as
U.S. pressure on Rios Montt to avoid
attracting attention if military aid were
to be ratified by Congress. The major
actors sought to play down the issue to
serve their own interests until the mili-
tary could be convinced of an alter-
native approach to the refugees. The ef-
fect is to obscure reality; the refugees
suffer in the process.
Moreover, it is clear that the Mexicans
would like the refugees removed from
their soil and, not having signed the
Protocol or Convention, the authorities
are allowed widesweeping and arbitrary
control. The refugees' status as "des-
plazados" and the formaI legal in-
frastructures permit the Mexican
authorities to prevent adequate
verifiability of projects and aid (funded
by the UN and other international agen-
cies). Alfredo Witschi, from the
UNHCR, visits the refugee area only
once a month, and admits that the best
existing or allowed mechanism for
critical assessment is through the
auditing process. (The UNHCR is per-
mitted to systematically screen the
budgeting of COMAR - but this does
not fulfil the requisites for adequate
verification. )
The UNHCR is aware of its jurisdic-
tionallimitations as in the case of Hon-
duras (also non-signatory). It is subiect
entirely to national and local law ~nd
custom. Recognizing the tenuousness of
its position, rather than jeopardizing the
entire project, the UNHCR prefers not
to assert itself excessively.
Information and examination are fur-
ther restricted. No agencies except the
Church (whose own status vis-a-vis the
refugees is subject to scrutiny by the
autl:orities) are permitted to work in the
region. Press access is highly restricted,
as are international observer visits to
camps. Roads and nearby small airports
are constantly patroIled to prevent en-
try into the zone. The less information
that flows out of the region, the more
autonomy the authorities have in exer-
cising their policy. They are not ac-
countable to any agency, nor are they
subject to criticism by the international
community.
As it stands, Mexico is reluctant to offer
the fleeing Guatemalans the benefits
that would be granted were they to
receive refugee status. They are neither
protected nor are there plans for a
"durable solution". Instead, the threat
of renewed Guatemalan army attacks
persists and they are denied freedom of
movement, access to gainful employ-
ment and access to land. They have no
schools (except where run by the
Church). They have no health clinics
(except where one may exist to treat
local populations) and the problem of
disease and malnutrition, though better
than a year ago, is dealt with only on
an ad hoc basis. The refugees exist only
as dependents of COMAR. The fostering
of occupational projects is hampered by
the UNHCR's limited logistical position.
But essentially, the Mexican approach is
to preserve a situation in which the
refugees enjoy a minimum of require-
ments for day-to-day existence, thereby
minimizing the attractiveness to their
staying in Mexico.
By impeding the outflow of information
and minimizing the ability to critically
assess the situation, Mexico leaves the
world in the dark, ensuring that little
pressure can be brought to bear on the
authorities to improve the lot of the
Guatemalans. And due to their static
and miserable lot, the refugees may find
the option of returning to Guatemala
more attractive, thereby allowing the
Mexicans to evict the refugees without
resorting to coercive measures.
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